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ABSTRACT. This paper develops an adaptive model on asset pricing and wealth dy-
namic of a nancial market with heterogeneous agents and examines the protability
of momentum and contrarian trading strategies. In order to characterize asset price,
wealth dynamics and rational adaptiveness arising from the interaction of heteroge-
neous agents with CRRA utility, an adaptive discrete time equilibrium model in terms
of return and wealth proportions (among heterogeneous representative agents) is es-
tablished. Taking trend followers and contrarians as the main heterogeneous agents in
themodel, theprotabilityofmomentumandcontrariantradingstrategiesisanalyzed.
Our results show the capability of the model to characterize some of the existing evi-
dence on many of anomalies observed in nancial markets, including the protability
of momentum trading strategies over short time intervals and of contrarian trading
strategies over long time intervals, rational adaptiveness of agents, overcondence
and underreaction, overreaction and herd behavior, excess volatility, and volatility
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1. INTRODUCTION
Thetraditionalasset-pricingmodelssuchasthecapitalassetpricingmodel(CAPM)
of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) of Ross
(1976), or the intertemporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) of Merton (1973)
have as one of their important assumptions, investor homogeneity. In particular the
paradigm of the representative agent assumes that all investors are homogeneous with
regardtotheirpreferences, theirexpectationsandtheirinvestmentstrategies. However,
as already argued by Keynes in the 1930s, agents do not have sufcient knowledge of
the structure of the economy to form correct mathematical expectations that would be
held by all agents.
The other important paradigm underpinning these models, the efcient market hy-
pothesis, assumes that the current price contains all available information and past
prices cannot help in predicting future prices. However there is evidence that mar-
kets are not always efcient and there are periods when real data show signicantly
higher than expected autocorrelation of returns. Over the last decade, a large vol-
ume of empirical work has documented a variety of ways in which asset returns can
be predicted based on publicly available information and many of the results can be
thought of as belonging to one of two broad categories of phenomena
1. On the one
hand, returns appear to exhibit continuation, or momentum, over short to medium time
intervals, which may imply the protability of momentum trading strategies over short
to medium time intervals. On the other hand, there is also tendency toward reversals
over long time intervals, leading to possible protability of contrarian strategies. The
traditional models of nance theory seem to have difculty in explaining this growing
set of stylized facts. As a result, there is a growing dissatisfaction with (i) models
of asset price dynamics based on the representative agent paradigm, as expressed for
example by Kirman (1992), and (ii) the extreme informational assumptions of rational
expectations.
As an alternative to the traditional models of nance theory, studies over the last
decade have involved some departure from the classical assumptions of strict ratio-
nality and unlimited computational capacity, and turned to heterogeneity and bounded
rationality of agents. This line of research has attempted to incorporate aspects of in-
vestor psychology into the standard asset pricing theory in nance and characterize the
interaction of heterogeneous agents, and to show that many of anomalies observed in
nancial markets are due to these effects.
Analytical models of how mistaken beliefs cause momentum (over short time inter-
vals)andreversal(overlongtimeintervals)havebeenconsideredbyBarberis, Shleifer,
andVishny(1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, andSubrahmanyam(1998)andHongandStein
(1999). All these models generate an impulse response function to a new information
signal in which there is gradual rise in the average reaction to a positive signal and a
gradual average process of correction.
Both Barberis et al (1998) and Daniel et al (1998) assume that prices are driven
by a single representative agent. They posit a small number of cognitive biases that
this representative agent might have, and then investigate the extent to which these are
sufcient to simultaneously deliver both short-horizon continuation and long-horizon
reversals.
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Hong and Stein (1999) pursue the same goal as Barberis et al (1998) and Daniel
et al (1998), but adopt a fundamentally different approach, and focus on the interac-
tion between heterogeneous agents. They consider a model of two types of boundedly
rational agentsnewswatchers and momentum traders. The newswatchers make fore-
casts based on signals that they privately observe about future fundamentals, not on the
current and past prices, while the momentum traders make simple forecasts based on
past prices. Under an assumption that private information diffuses gradually across the
newswatcher population, they provide a unied account of under- and overreactions. If
information diffuses gradually across the population, prices underreact in the short run.
Therefore early momentum buyers using simple trend-chasing strategies can prot
from the price underreaction. On the other hand, early momentum buyers impose a
negative externality on late momentum buyers, leading inevitably to overraction at
long horizons.
In nancial markets, individuals are imperfectly rational. It is believed that, as they
learn from their trading outcomes, the market will progress eventually toward the fully
rational equilibrium. A number of recent models use this evolutionary approach to
characterize the interactions of heterogeneous agents in nancial markets (e.g. Brock
and Hommes (1997), (1998), Bullard and Duffy (1999), Chiarella (1992), Chiarella
and He (2002a), (2002b), Day and Huang (1990), Farmer (1999), Farmer and Lo
(1999), Franke and Nesemann (1999), Frankel and Froot (1987), Hommes (2001),
LeBaron (2000), Lux (1995), and Lux and Marchesi (1999)). To avoid the constraints
of analytical tractability, many of these authors use computer simulations to explore a
wider space of economic settings. A general nding in many of these studies that long-
horizon agents frequently do not drive short-horizon agents out of nancial markets,
and that populations of long- and short-horizon agents can create patterns of volatility
and volume similar to actual empirical patterns.
In their framework, Brock and Hommes (1997), (1998) propose to model economic
and nancial markets as adaptive belief system (ABS), which is essentially an evo-
lutionary competition among trading strategies. A key aspect of these models is that
they exhibit expectations feedback and adaptiveness of agents. Agents adapt their be-
liefs over time by choosing from different predictors or expectations functions, based
upon their past performance as measured by realized prots. Agents are boundedly
rational, in the sense that most traders choose strategies with higher tness. The evolu-
tional model generates endogenous price uctuations with similar statistical properties
as those observed in nancial markets. The model of Brock and Hommes has been ex-
tended in Chiarella and He (2002b) by allowing agents to have different risk attitudes
and different expectation formation schemes for both rst and second moments of the
price distribution.
Levy and Levy (1996) and Levy, Levy and Solomon (1994) consider a more realistic
model where investors' optimal decisions depend on their wealth (resulting from the
underlying CRRA utility function) and both price and wealth processes are thus grow-
ing. Using numerical simulations and comparing the stock price dynamics in models
with homogeneous and heterogeneous expectations, they conclude that the homoge-
neous expectation assumption leads to a highly inefcient market with periodic (and
therefore predictable) booms and crashes while introduction of heterogeneous expec-
tations leads to much more realistic dynamics.
Chiarella and He (2001) develop a model of interaction of portfolio decisions and
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asset price and wealth is rst obtained. To characterize the interaction of heteroge-
neous agents in nancial markets and conduct a theoretical analysis, stationary models
in terms of return and wealth proportions (among different types of agents) are then de-
veloped. As a special case of the general heterogeneous model, these authors consider
models of homogeneous agents and of two heterogeneous agents without switching
among them.
In this paper, we establish an adaptive model on asset pricing and wealth dynamics
of heterogeneous agents, which extends the model in Chiarella and He (2001) further
by adding a switching mechanism among different types of trading strategies. Based
on certain tness measures, such as the realized wealth, the agents are allowed to
switch from one strategy to another from time to time. Consequently a model with
adaptive beliefs is established where an evolutionary dynamics across predictor choice
is coupled to the dynamics of the endogenous variable.
Empirical studies provide some evidence that momentum trading (or trend follow-
ing) strategies are more protable over short time intervals, while contrarian trading
strategies are more protable over long time intervals (e.g. Arshanapali et al (1998),
Asnee (1997), Capaul et al (1993), Fama and French (1998), Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993), (2001), Lee and Swaminathan (2000), Levis and Liodakis (2001), Moskowitz
and Grinblatt (1999) and Rouwenhorst (1998)). To characterize the protability of mo-
mentum and contrarian trading strategies, quasi-homogeneous model is introduced, in
which agents use exactly the same trading strategies except for having different time
intervals. Our results in general support the empirical ndings on the protability of
the momentum and contrarian trading strategies. In addition, the model also exhibits
underlying rationale for various anomalies observed in nancial markets, including,
overcondence and underreaction, overreaction and herd behavior, excess volatility,
and volatility clustering.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes an adaptive asset pricing
and wealth dynamic model with heterogeneous beliefs from agents. It is shown how
the distributions of the wealth and population across heterogeneous agents are mea-
sured. As a simple case, a model of two types of agents is then considered in Section
3. To characterize the protability of momentum and contrarian trading strategies, a
quasi-homogeneous model is also introduced as a special case of the model of two
types of agent in Section 3. The protability of momentum and contrarian trading
strategies is then analyzed in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2. ADAPTIVE MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS
This section is devoted to establish an adaptive asset pricing and wealth dynamic
model with heterogeneous beliefs among agents. The model can been treated as a
generalization of some recent asset pricing models on the interaction between hetero-
geneous agents, say for example, Barberis et al (1998), Brock and Hommes (1998),
Chiarella and He (2001), Daniel et al (1998), Hong and Stein (1999) and Levy and
Levy (1996). The key characteristics of this modelling framework are the adaptive-
ness, the heterogeneity and the interaction of the economic agents. The heterogeneity
is expressed in terms of different views on expectations of the distribution of future
returns on the risky asset. The modelling framework of this paper extends that of the
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(1998) considered only asset price dynamics) and by allowing a mechanism of adap-
tiveness of heterogeneous agents (Chiarella and He (2001) considered xed proportion
of heterogeneous agents).
The setting of the following adaptive model is similar to the one in Chiarella and
He (2001) and Levy and Levy (1996). Our hypothetical nancial market contains two
investment choices: a stock (or index of stocks) and a bond. The bond is assumed to be
a risk free asset and the stock is a risky asset. The model considered in the following
is discrete time model, in which investors are allowed to revise their portfolios at each
time interval.
Following the standard portfolio optimization approach, a growth model in terms of
price and wealth is established rst in this section. Then, to reduce the growth model
to a stationary model, the return on the risky asset and the wealth proportions (among
heterogeneous investors), instead of price and wealth, are used as state variables to
form a stationary model. Based on a certain performance (or tness) measure, an
adaptive mechanism is nally introduced, leading to a general adaptive model. This
is a model of asset price and wealth dynamics that characterizes three important and
related issues in nancial markets: heterogeneity, adaptiveness, and interaction.
2.1. Notations. Denote
pt : Price (ex dividend) per share of the risky asset at time t;
yt : Dividend at time t;
R : Risk free return with risk free rate r = R   1;
N : Total number of shares of the risky asset;
H : Total number of investors;
Ni;t : Number of shares acquired by agent i at time t;
Wi;t : Wealth of agent i at time t;
Wi;0 : Initial wealth of agent i;
i;t : Proportion of wealth of agent i invested in the risky asset at time t;
t : The return on the risky asset at period t:
It is assumed that
2 all the investors have the same attitude to risk with the same utility
function U(W) = log(W). Following the above notation, the return on the risky asset
at period t is then dened by
3
t =
pt   pt 1 + yt
pt 1
: (2.1)
2To make the following analysis more tractable and transparent, the assumption that all investors have
the same utility function U(W) = log(W) is maintained in this paper. However, the analysis can be
generalized to the case of the utility functions that allow agents to have different risk coefcients, say,
Ui(W) = (W i 1)=i with 0 < i < 1. The dynamics generated by different risk aversion coefcient
i is an interesting and important issue that is left for future work.
3The return can also be dened by the difference of logarithms of the prices. It is known that the
difference between these two denition becomes smaller and smaller as the time interval is reduced
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2.2. PortfolioOptimizationProblemofHeterogeneousAgents. Followingthestan-
dard portfolio optimization approach, the wealth of agent (or investor) i at time period
t + 1 is given by
Wi;t+1 =(1   i;t)Wi;tR + i;tWi;t(1 + t+1)
=Wi;t[R + i;t(t+1   r)]: (2.2)
As in Brock and Hommes (1998) and Levy and Levy (1996), a Walrasian scenario is
used to derive the demand equation, i.e., each trader is viewed as a price taker and the
market is viewed as nding (via the Walrasian auctioneer) the price pt that equates the
sumofthesedemandschedulestothesupply. Thatis, theagentstreattheperiodtprice,
pt, as parametric when solving their optimisation problem to determine i;t. Denote
by Ft = fpt 1; ;yt;yt 1;g the information set
4 formed at time t. Let Et;Vt be
the conditional expectation and variance, respectively, based on Ft, and Ei;t;Vi;t be the
beliefs of investor i about the conditional expectation and variance. Then it follows
from (2.2) that
Ei;t(Wi;t+1) = Wi;t[R + i;t(Ei;t(t+1)   r)];
Vi;t(Wi;t+1) = W 2
i;t2
i;tVi;t(t+1): (2.3)
Consider investor i, who faces a given price pt, has wealth Wi;t and believes that the
asset return is conditionally normally distributed with mean Ei;t(t+1) and variance
Vi;t(t+1). This investor chooses a proportion i;t of his/her wealth to be invested in










Heterogeneous beliefs are introduced via the assumption that
Ei;t(t+1) = fi(t 1; ;t Li); Vi;t(t+1) = gi(t 1; ;t Li)
for i = 1; ;H, where Li are integers, fi;gi are some deterministic functions which
can be differ across investors. Under this assumption, both Ei;t(t+1) and Vi;t(t+1) are
functions of the past prices up to t 1, which in turn implies the optimum wealth pro-
portion i;t, dened by (2.4), is a function of the history of the prices (pt 1;pt 2;)
6.
4Because of the Walrasian scenario, the hypothetical price pt at time t is included in the information set
to determine the market clearing price. However, agents form their expectations by using the past prices
up to time t   1.
5See Appendix A.1 in Chiarella and He (2001) for details.
6In Levy and Levy (1996), the hypothetical price pt is included in the above conditional expectations
on the return and variance. In this case, the market clearing price is solved implicitly and is much more
involved mathematically. The approach adopted here is the standard one in deriving the price via the
Walrasian scenario and also keeps the mathematical analysis tractable. A similar approach has been
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2.3. Market Clearing Equilibrium PriceA Growth Model. The optimum pro-
portion of investment in the risky asset, i;t, determines the number of shares at price





Summing the demands of all investors gives the aggregate demand. The total number
of shares in the market, denoted by N, is assumed to be xed. Hence the market












i;tWi;t = Npt: (2.5)
Thus, in this model, as in real markets, the equilibrium price pt and the wealth of
investors, Wt  (W1;t; ;WH;t), are determined simultaneously by (2.2) and (2.5).
The optimum demands of investors are functions of the price and their wealth. Also,
as observed in nancial markets, the model implies that both the price and the wealth




ance of the return t+1, and hence the optimum wealth proportion (i;t) invested in the
risky asset for the investors are the same. Assume all the investors can be grouped as
h types (or groups) and group j has `j;t investors at time t with j = 1; ;h, then
`1;t++`h;t = H. Denote nj;t as the proportion of the number of investors in group
j, at time t, relative to the total number of the investors, H, that is, nj;t = `j;t=H, so
that n1;t +  + nh;t = 1.
Some simple examples on return and wealth dynamics when proportions of different
types of agents nj;t are xed over time are illustrated in Chiarella and He (2001). This
is a highly simplied assumption. It would be more realistic to allow agents to adjust
their beliefs from time to time, based on some performance or tness measures (say,
for example, the realized returns or errors, as in Brock and Hommes (1998)). In this
way, one can account for investor psychology and herd behavior
7. As a consequence,
the proportions of different types of agents become endogenous state variables. There-
fore (n1;t;n2;t; ;nh;t) measures the population distribution among different types
of heterogeneous agents. The change in the distribution over time can be used to mea-
sure herd behavior among heterogeneous agents, in particular, during highly volatile
periods in nancial markets.
2.5. HeterogeneousRepresentativeAgentsandWealthDistributionMeasure. For
investors within the group j, the optimum demands on wealth proportions to be in-
vested in the risky asset are the same, and are denoted by  j;t. Let  Wj;t be the average
wealth of each investor within group j (so that `j;t  Wj;t gives the total wealth of group
j).
7See more discussion on this aspect in the next section.8 CARL CHIARELLA AND XUE-ZHONG HE
To measure the average wealth distribution among heterogeneous representative
agents, introduce  wj;t to be the average wealth proportion of group j relative to the








One can see that the average wealth proportion vector (  w1;t;  w2;t; ;  wh;t) corre-
sponds to the wealth distribution among representatives of heterogeneous agents of
different types, it measure the average wealth levels used in the different trading strate-
gies.
2.6. Performance Measure, Population Evolution and Adaptiveness. Following
Brock and Hommes (1997), (1998), a performance measure or tness function, say
(1;t; ;h;t), is publicly available to all agents. Based on the performance measure
agents make a (boundedly) rational choice among the predictors. This results in the
Adaptive Rational Equilibrium Dynamics, introduced by Brock and Hommes (1997),
an evolutionary dynamics across predictor choice which is coupled to the dynamics
of the endogenous variables. In the limit as the number of agents goes to innity,
the probability that an agent j chooses trading strategy j is given by the well known
discrete choice model or `Gibbs' probabilities
8
nj;t = exp[(j;t 1   Cj)]=Zt Zt =
h X
j=1
exp[(j;t 1   Cj)]; (2.7)
where Cj  0 measures the cost of the strategy j for j = 1;2; ;h.
The crucial feature of (2.7) is that the higher the tness of trading strategy j, the
more traders will select strategy j. The parameter , called intensity of choice or
switching intensity, plays an important role and can be used to characterize various
psychological effects, as discussed by Hirshleifer (2001).
 Overcondence and Underreaction.
Edwards, (1968) identied the phenomenon of conservatism, that under ap-
propriate circumstances individuals are overcondent. They do not change
their beliefs as much as would a rational Bayesian in the face of new evidence.
One explanation for conservatism is that processing new information and up-
dating beliefs is costly. Another is that, in a stable environment, self-deception
can cause conservatism because an individual who has explicitly adopted a be-
lief may be reluctant to admit to having made a mistake. Conservatism implies
under-weighting of new evidence. Both overcondence and underreaction can
be partially measured when the switching intensity parameter  is small. In an
extreme case when  = 0, there is no switching among strategies and agents
populations are evenly distributed across all trading strategies
9.
 Overreaction and Herd Behavior.
If the environment is volatile, or agents are less conservative and less con-
dent about their beliefs, there may be no dishonor in recognizing that different
8See Manski and McFadden (1981) and Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1993)) for extensive discussion
of discrete choice models and their applications in economics.
9See Chiarella and He (2001) for models with xed, but not evenly distributed, population proportion
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beliefs are called for and investors are more willing to switch to beliefs which
generate better outcomes. This can be measured when the switching intensity
parameter  is high. An increase in the switching intensity  represents an
increase in the degree of rationality with respect to evolutionary selection of
trading strategies. In an extreme case when  is very large (close to innity),
a large proportion of traders are willing to switch more quickly to successful
trading strategies. Consequently, market overreaction and herd behavior may
be observed.
A natural performance measure or tness function can be taken as a weighted av-
erage of the realized wealth return on the proportion invested in the risky asset, given
by
j;t = j;t + j;t 1;
for j = 1; ;h, where 0    1 and
j;t =  j;t 1
 Wj;t    Wj;t 1
 Wj;t 1
=  j;t 1[r + (t   r) j;t 1]
is the realized wealth return invested in the risky asset in period t. Here  is a memory
parameter measuring how fast past realized tness is discounted for strategy selection.
2.7. An Adaptive Model. The above growth model is rendered stationary by formu-
lating it in terms of the stock return and the relative proportions of the wealth among
the investors, instead of the wealth Wt and the stock price pt.
Proposition 2.1. The average wealth proportions evolve according to
 wi;t =
 wi;t 1[R + (t   r) i;t 1]
Ph
j=1  wj;t 1[R + (t   r) j;t 1]
(i = 1; ;h) (2.8)
with return t given by10
t = r +
Ph
i=1  wi;t 1[(1 + r)(ni;t 1 i;t 1   ni;t i;t)   tni;t 1 i;t 1]
Ph
i=1  i;t 1  wi;t 1(ni;t i;t   ni;t 1)
; (2.9)
where t corresponds to dividend yield dened by t = yt=pt 1. The population
proportions nj;t evolve according to
ni;t = exp[(i;t 1   Cj)]=Zt; (2.10)
where the tness functions are dened by
i;t = i;t + i;t 1; 0    1;
i;t =  i;t 1
 Wi;t    Wi;t 1
 Wi;t 1





and Ci  0 measure the cost of the strategy for i = 1;2; ;h.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
10It is easy to check that t  r is a trivial solution. As a necessary condition for investing in risky
asset, we assume that E(t) > r.10 CARL CHIARELLA AND XUE-ZHONG HE
It is easy to see that, when h  H, `j  1 and  = 0 for j = 1; ;h, Proposition
2.1 leads to the model in Chiarella and He (2001) with xed proportion nj;t = nj (j =
1; ;h) among heterogeneous types of agents.
2.8. Trading Strategies. The adaptive model established in Proposition 2.1 is incom-
plete unless the conditional expectations of agents on the mean and variance of returns
are specied. Different trading strategies can be incorporated into this general adaptive
model. To illustrate various features of the model, this paper considers only three sim-
ple, but well-documented, types of agents, termed fundamentalist, momentum traders
and contrarians. Neither type is fully rational in the usual sense. The information on
the dividends and realized prices is publicly available to all trader types.
2.8.1. Fundamental traders. The fundamentalists make forecasts on the risk premium
level based on both public and their private information about future fundamentals. It
is assumed that
EF;t(t+1) = r + F; (2.11)
where EF;t denotes the fundamentalists' expected return on t+1 for the next period
t + 1 and F is the risk premium estimated
11 of the fundamental traders. That is, the
fundamentalists believe that the excess conditional mean for the risky asset (from the
risk-free rate) is given by the risk premium F.
2.8.2. Momentum Traders. Momentum traders, in contrast to the fundamental traders,
do condition on the past prices. Momentum, or positive feedback, trading has several
possible motivations, one being that investors form expectations of future prices by
extrapolating trends. They buy into price trends and exaggerate trends, leading to
overshooting. As a result there may be excess volatility.
In an efcient market, a stock having good growth prospects does not necessarily
have good prospects for future risk-adjusted returns (which are on average zero). If
people mistakenly extend their favorable evaluation of a stock's earnings prospects to
its return prospects, growth stocks will be overpriced (see Lakonishok et al (1994) and
Shefrin and Statman (1995)).
Empirical studies have subscribed to the view that momentum trading strategies
yield signicant prots over short time intervals (e.g. Asnee (1997), Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993), (2001), Lee and Swaminathan (2000), Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999)
and Rouwenhorst (1998)). Although these results have been well accepted, the source
of the prots and the interpretation of the evidence are widely debated. In addition,
there does not exist in the literature a quantied model to clarify and justify such
evidence. Asarststep, thisissueisdiscussedinthenextsectionwithintheframework
of the adaptive heterogeneous model outlined in Proposition 2.1.
For momentum traders, it is assumed in this paper that their forecasts are simple
functions of the history of past returns. More precisely, it is assumed that







period t + 1 and M is their risk premium estimated and dM > 0 corresponds to the
11A constant risk premium is a simplied assumption. In practice, the risk premium is not necessarily
constant but could also be a function of the variance, for example.ADAPTIVE MODEL AND WEALTH DYNAMICS OF MOMENTUM STRATEGIES 11
extrapolation rate of the momentum trading strategy. The integer LM  1 corresponds
to the memory length of momentum traders. In other words, the expected excess return
(from risk-free rate) of momentum agents has two components: their estimated risk
premium M and trend extrapolation dM  M;t, which is positively proportional to the
moving average of the returns over the last LM time periods.
2.8.3. Contrarian Traders. The protability of contrarian investment strategies is now
a well-established empirical facts in the nance literature (see, for example, Levis and
Liodakis (2001)). Empirical evidence suggests that over long time intervals, contrar-
ian strategies generate signicant abnormal returns (see, for example, Arshanapali et
al (1998), Fama and French (1998), and Capaul et al (1993)). Some evidence has
shown that overreaction can use aggregate stock market value measures such as divi-
dend yield to predict future market returns, so that contrarian investment strategies are
on average protable. In spite of the apparent robustness of such strategies, the under-
lying rationale for their success remains a matter of lively debate in both academic and
practitioner communities.
In the following section, the role of expectational errors in explaining the protabil-
ity of contrarian strategies is examined. For contrarian strategy, it is assumed that






where EC;t(t+1) denotes the expected return of contrarian agents on t+1 for the next
period t + 1 and C is their estimated risk premium and dC > 0 corresponds to their
extrapolation rate. The integer LC  1 corresponds to the memory length of contrarian
agents. In other words, contrarian agents believe that the difference of excess condi-
tional mean and the risk premium [EC;t(t+1)   r]   C is negatively proportional to
the moving average of the returns over the last LC time periods.
3. AN ADAPTIVE MODEL OF TWO TYPES OF AGENTS
In the rest of this paper, the focus will be on a simple model of just two types of
agentsmomentum traders and contrarian traders. In this case, the adaptive model
developed in Section 2 can be reduced to a simple form, as indicated below. To ex-
amine protability of momentum and contrarian trading strategies over different time
intervals, a special case of the model, termed quasi-homogeneous model, is then con-
sidered. Detailed discussion on the dynamics of such quasi-homogeneous models, in-
cluding protability, herd behavior, price overshooting, statistical patterns of returns,
is then undertaken in the following sections.
3.1. Notation. Assume that there are only two different types trading strategies. Let
 wt,  nt be the difference of the average wealth proportions and population proportions
of type 1 and type 2 agents; that is
 wt =  w1;t    w2;t; nt = n1;t   n2;t: (3.1)
Then it follows from  w1;t +  w2;t = 1 and n1;t + n2;t = 1 that
 w1;t =
1 +  wt
2
;  w2;t =
1    wt









Correspondingly, the adaptive model in Proposition 2.1 can be reduced to a simple
form.
3.2. The Model for Two Types of Agents. Given the above notations, the adaptive
model for two types of agents following different trading strategies assumes the form
give by Proposition 3.1.






with return t given by





f1 = (1 +  wt)[1 + r + (t+1   r) 1;t];
f2 = (1    wt)[1 + r + (t+1   r) 2;t];
g11 = (1 +  wt)[(1 + r   t+1)(1 +  nt) 1;t   (1 + r)(1 +  nt+1) 1;t+1];
g12 = (1    wt)[(1 + r   t+1)(1    nt) 1;t   (1 + r)(1    nt+1) 2;t+1];
g21 = (1 +  wt) 1;t[(1 +  nt+1) 1;t+1   (1 +  nt)];
g22 = (1    wt) 2;t[(1    nt+1) 2;t+1   (1    nt)]





((1;t   2;t)   (C1   C2))]; (3.4)
where the tness functions are dened as
j;t+1 =  j;t[r + (t+1   r) j;t] + j;t; (3.5)
and Cj  0 measure the cost of the strategy for j = 1;2.
3.3. Wealthdistributionandprotabilityoftradingstrategies. Theaveragewealth
distribution among two types of agents (following different trading strategies) is now
characterized by  wt, the difference of the average wealth proportions. Over a certain
time period, if  wt staysabove(below) theinitial value  wo andincreases(decreases)sig-
nicantly as t increases, then, on average, type 1 agents accumulate more (less) wealth
than type 2 agents, and one may say type 1 trading strategy is more (less) protable
than type 2 trading strategy. Otherwise, if the difference is not signicantly different
from  wo, then there is no evidence that on average either trading strategies is more
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3.4. Populationdistributionandherdbehavior. Thedistribution onpopulations us-
ing different types trading strategies is now characterized by the difference of the pop-
ulation proportions nt. At time period t, if nt is positive (negative), then this indicates
that there are more (less) agents using type 1 trading strategy than type 2 trading strat-
egy. Moreover, if nt is signicantly different from zero, then this could be taken as an
indication of herd behavior. This is, in particular, frequently observed to be the case
when the switching intensity  > 0 is high.
When there is evidence on the protability of type 1 (type 2) trading strategy and a
clear indication on herd behavior using type 1 (type 2) trading strategy over the time
period, we say type 1 (type 2) trading strategy dominates the market.
3.5. A Quasi-Homogeneous Model. As a special case of the adaptive model with
two types of agents, consider the case, termed quasi-homogeneous model, where both
types of agents use exactly the same trading strategies except that they use different
memory lengths.
The trading strategies for all three types of agents can be unied in the following
form:






for i = 1;2, where Li  1 is integer, r(> 0);i(> 0) and di 2 R are constants. For
quasi-homogeneous model, 1 = 2 = ;d1 = d2 = d but 1  L1  L2.
In the following discussion, assume that the conditional variances of agents are
given by a constant 2. One can standardize both the risk premium  and extrapo-
lation rate d as follows:
  =

2;  d =
d
2:
Correspondingly, the optimal demand of type j agents in terms of the wealth propor-
tion invested in the risky asset is given by
j;t =  j +  dj j;t:
We also assume that the dividend yield process has the form
t = o + qN(0;1); (3.7)
where N(0;1) is the standard normal distribution.
Because of the highly nonlinear nature of the adaptive model theoretical analysis
(even of the steady states) seems intractable and thus the model is analyzed numeri-
cally.
3.5.1. Existence of steady-state returns. If t = o is a constant, the system (3.2)-
(3.6) becomes a deterministic system. How distributions of noise processes, such as
the dividend yield process in our model, can be affected by the underlying dynamics of
nonlinear deterministic systems is an important and interesting issue, but one for which
there is little theory to serve as a guide. Understanding the underlying dynamics of the
deterministicsystems, suchasexistenceofsteady-states, theirstabilityandbifurcation,
is naturally a rst step towards the goal of understanding the noise perturbed system.
When t = o is a constant, in terms of steady-state of return and wealth propor-
tions, it is easy to see that the quasi-homogeneous model has the same steady-state as
the homogeneous model (with L1 = L2) does. The existence of such steady-state is
studied in Chiarella and He (2001) and the results are summarized in the following.14 CARL CHIARELLA AND XUE-ZHONG HE
 The steady-state of the wealth proportions stays at their initial level, while the
steady-state of the return depends on the extrapolation rate  d.
 There is a unique steady-state return when  d = 0. In other words, when agents
are fundamentalists, there is a unique steady-state return and, for convenience
of discussion, it is called the fundamental steady-state return. Moreover, high
risk premia  correspond to high levels of the steady-state return.
 There exist two steady-state returns when  d < 0, that is when agents are con-
trarians. One of the steady-state returns is negative while the other is posi-
tive, the positive steady-state return is called the contrarian steady-state return.
More importantly, with the same risk premium, when agents act as contrarians,
the contrarian steady-state return is pushed below the fundamental steady-state
return.
 There exist two steady-state returns when  d > 0 small. That is, when agents
are momentum traders and they extrapolate weakly, the return has two positive
xed steady-states. However, when  d is close zero, only one of the steady-state
is bounded and this steady-state return is called the momentum steady-state re-
turn. Furthermore, given the same risk premium, compared to the fundamental
equilibrium, a weakly homogeneous momentum trading strategy (i.e.  d > 0
small) leads to a higher level of steady-state return.
An aim of the following analysis is to determine to what extent the adaptive model
for two types of agents reects these characteristics.
3.5.2. Parameters and initial values selection. Using data for the United States during
the 1926-94 period, as reported by Ibbotson Associates, the annual risk-free interest
rate, r = 3:7%, corresponds to the average rate during that period. The initial history
of rates of return on the stock consists of a distribution with a mean of 12.2% and a
standard derivation of 20.4%. A mean dividend yield of o = 4:7% corresponds to the
historical average yield on the S&P500. The initial share price is po = $10:00.
The analysis in the following sections, selects the annual risk-free rate r, standard
derivation  and the mean dividend yield o as indicated above. For the simulations,
the time period between each trade is one day and simulations are conducted over 20
years. Parameters and initial values are selected as follows, unless state otherwise,
  = 0:6; = 0:5; = 0:5;C1 = C2 = 0 (3.8)
and
 wo = 0;no = 0;1;o = 2;0 = 0:5;po = $10: (3.9)
Furthermore, annual rates of risk-free rate and returns of the risky asset are used in the
tness functions j;t for j = 1;2.
4. WEALTH DYNAMICS OF MOMENTUM TRADING STRATEGIES
This section considers the quasi-homogeneous model with d1 = d2 = d > 0 and
1  L1 < L2, that is both types of agents follow the same momentum trading strategy
except for having different memory lengths. An interesting question is which type of
agent dominates the market over the time.
As discussed in section 2, some empirical studies seem to support a view that mo-
mentumtradersareprotableovershorttimeintervals, butnotoverlongtimeintervals.
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effect of lag length on the wealth dynamics
12. The results indicate in general that, the
strategy with short memory length will dominate the market by accumulating more
wealth and attracting more population. Thus the adaptive model outlined in this paper
is capable of characterizing some broad features found in empirical studies.
4.1. Case: (L1;L2) = (3;5). The following subsection considers rst the dynamics
of the underlying deterministic system, that is, when q = 0. The impact of the noise
processes on the dynamics is then considered in the subsequent subsection.
4.1.1. No-noise Case. Taken q = 0. For  d = 0:5, initial population proportion no = 0
and any initial wealth proportion  wo, numerical simulations show that
t ! 
 = 15:45% (annual);  wt !  wo; nt ! 0:
By changing various parameters and initial values, we obtain the following results
on the momentum trading strategies from the quasi-homogeneous model presented in
section 3.
(i) Risk premium and over-pricing.
It is found that, ceteris paribus, for   = =2 = 0:35, t !  = 10:94%,
while for   = 0:53,  = 15:45%. In general, a high level of risk-adjusted
premium leads to a high return, and a high price as well. In fact, for the given
parameters, there exists o 2 (0:69;0:7), so called bifurcation value
13, such
that the returns converge to xed values for   < o and diverge for   > o,
leading to price explosion.
(ii) Over-extrapolation and overshooting.
Momentum traders form expectations of future prices by extrapolating trends.
However, when the prices or returns are over-extrapolated, stocks are over-
priced, and as a result, overshooting takes place. Based on the parameters
selected, there exists do 2 (0:573;0:574) such that, ceteris paribus, returns
converge to xed values for  d < do and diverge for  d > do, leading prices to
exhibit overshooting.
(iii) No noise, no effects on population and wealth distribution and no herd behav-
ior.
Foreitherxedno 6= 0andarangeof  wo (sayno =  0:3and  wo 2 ( 0:5;0:3)),
or xed  wo 6= 0 and a range of no (say,  wo =  0:3 and no 2 ( 1;0:3)),
t ! 
 = 15:45% (annual);  wt !  wo + ; nt ! 0
with   10 6. Also, the switching intensity parameter  has almost no effect
on the results (as long as the returns series converge to constants). This implies
that, without the noise from the dividend yield process, in terms of protability,
type 1 trading strategy is slightly better than type 2, but not signicantly. In ad-
dition, the populations of agents using different strategies become evenly dis-
tributed. In other words, no one of the momentum trading strategies dominates
the market, even though both wealth and population are not evenly distributed
initially. Therefore, when there is no noise from the dividend yield process and
12The selection of various combinations of lag lengths is arbitrary. However other simulations (not
reported) indicate some robustness of the results presented in this paper.
13As in Brock and Hommes (1998), the dynamics of the system through various types of bifurcation
can be analyzed and one of interest. However, in this paper, we focus on the dynamics of the stochastic
system when the return process of the underlying deterministic system is stable.16 CARL CHIARELLA AND XUE-ZHONG HE
the returns converge to constants, the average wealth proportions, as expected,
stay at their initial level, while the average population proportions are evenly
distributed, and there is no herd behavior.
4.1.2. Effect of Noise. Select the annualized standard derivation of the noisy dividend
yield process, q = 0:03 = 3%. When adding a noisy dividend process to the adap-
tive system, the general features of the corresponding deterministic system (without
the noise), such as the results (i)-(ii) above, still hold. However, it has a signicant
impact on the dynamics of the system, such as wealth and population distributions,
autocorrelation of returns, volatility of returns and prices etc., as indicated below. In
particular, the dynamics of the model is greatly affected by agents' behavior, which
is measured by their extrapolation rate,  d, and switching intensity, . The following
discussion is focused on the dynamics of the system for various combinations of these
two parameters  d and .
The following results are based on the parameters selected above, unless otherwise
indicated.
 Wealth distribution.
Wealth distribution is largely inuenced by agents' extrapolation and strategy
switching activity. It is found that, in general, a strong extrapolation leads
type 1 agents (with lag 3) accumulate more wealth than type 2 agents do. In
other words, type1trading strategy(with lagof 3)ismore protablethan type2
(with lag of 5) under the noisy dividend process. Furthermore, as the switching
intensity  increases, the protability of type 1 trading strategy is improved
signicantly. This result is unexpected and interesting. This result is optimal
in terms of the initial wealth and population distributions.
 Effect of the initial wealth distribution.
When the wealth and population are evenly distributed across the two
types of agents initially (i.e.  wo = 0;no = 0), on average, type 1 agents
accumulate more wealth (about 5% to 6%) than type 2 agents over the
whole period, as indicated by the time series plot for the wealth (  wt) in
Figure 4.1. Also, as the extrapolations rate increases (i.e. as  d increases),
type 1 agents accumulate more wealth than type 2 agents (say, about 2%
to 3% more for  d = 0:5, compared to 5-6% more for  d = 0:53). This sug-
gests that, when both types of agents start with the same level of wealth
and have the same number of traders, agents using short memory length
accumulate more wealth than ones using long memory span. In other
words, type 1 trading strategy is more protable under the noisy dividend
process. This result still holds when the initial wealth is not so evenly dis-
tributed. However, on average, when type 1 agents start with more wealth
than type 2 (say  wo = 0:2, that is type 1 agents have 20% more initial
wealth than type 2 agents do on average), the prices can be pushed imme-
diately to very high levels so that any further trend chasing from type 1
agents can cause price to overshoot, leading an explosion of price.
 Effect of the initial population distribution
For a xed initial wealth proportion  wo (say  wo = 0) and a range of no
(say, no 2 ( 1;0:5)),  wt increases in t. But for large no (say no = 0:6),
the prices are pushed to explosion. This indicates that type 1 agents ac-
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2 agents is high initially. However, an initial over concentration of type 1
agents can lead to overshooting of price.
 Herd behavior.
Herd behavior is measured by the population proportion difference nt and the
switching intensity parameter . For  = 0, there is no switching between
the two trading strategies. However, when agents are allowed to switch (i.e.,
 > 0), as indicated by the time series plot for the population (nt) in Figure
4.1, agents switch between two strategies frequently. In general, because of
the protability of type 1 strategy, more agents switch from type 2 to type
1, as indicated by the mean and standard deviation of the population nt in
Table A.2.1. Also, as the switching intensity  increases, the frequency of
such switching increases too. Furthermore, as  increases, both prices and
returns become more volatile, as indicated by the time series plots on returns
(t) and prices (pt) in Figure 4.1.
 Excess volatility and volatility clustering.
As indicated by the time series plot of returns t in Figure 4.1, adding the noisy
dividend process causes an otherwise stable return series to uctuate. This fact
itself is not unexpected. What is of interest is the contrast between the simply
normally distributed dividend process that is input to the system and the return
process that is the output of the system. With the increase of either the standard
derivation of the noise process q, or agents extrapolation rate  d, or switching
intensity , both returns and prices become more volatile. Moreover, volatility
clustering is also observed.
 Autocorrelation.
Signicant positive autocorrelation (AC) for lags 1 and 2, negative for lags 3
to 8, positive for lags 9-14, are founded, as indicated by Table A.2.4. However,
as lag length increases, the ACs become less signicant.
 Overshooting.
Related simulations indicate that either strong extrapolation (corresponding to
high  d), or high volatility of the dividend yield process (q), or high switching
density () can cause price to overshoot and lead to price explosion. Numerical
simulations also show that, to avoid price overshooting, a minimum level of
risk premium ( ) is required.
4.2. Other Lag Length Combinations. How the above results are affected by dif-
ferent lag length combinations is interesting and important, and is addressed in the
following.
 (L1;L2) = (3;7): The general dynamic features are similar to the case when
(L1;L2) = (3;5), except for the following differences.
 The underlying deterministic system is stable over a wide range of ex-
trapolation rates  d 2 [0;d). d  0:57 for L2 = 5 and d  0:773 for
L2 = 7.
 The trading strategy with short lag dominates the market. Similar impacts
of initial wealth and population distributions, the switching intensity, and
the standard derivation of the noisy process on the returns and wealth dy-
namics are also observed over a wider range of the parameters and initial
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FIGURE 4.1. Time series plots for returns (top left), wealth (top
right) and population (bottom left) distributions, and prices (bottom
right) when the same momentum trading strategies with different lags
(L1;L2) = (3;5) are used. Here,   = 0:6;  d = 0:53 and q = 0:03.
parameters and initial values, both the protability and herd behavior in-
crease, as indicated by the time series plots for wealth and population in
Figure A.2.1 and the corresponding statistical result in Table A.2.1.
 ACs are signicantly positive for lags 1 and 2, either positive or negative
for lag 3, but not signicantly, negative for lags 4 to 9, positive for lags 10
to 15, as indicated in Table A.2.4 .
 (L1;L2) = (10;14): Compared with the previous two cases, the following
differences have been observed.
 The upper bound d for returns of the underlying deterministic system to
be stable increases to d  1:57.
 By adding the noisy process, the trading strategy with memory length 10
accumulates more wealth than the one with lag length 14. However, com-
paring with the previous cases, for the same set of parameters and initial
values, the protability and herd behavior of the strategy of lag 10 over
the one with lag 14 is much less signicant (at about 0.1% to 0.2%), as
indicated by the time series plots in Figure A.2.2 and the corresponding
statistical results in Table A.2.2; although an increase of extrapolation im-
proves the protability of the strategy with lag 10, as indicated by the time
series plots in Figure 4.2 and the corresponding statistics in Table A.2.2
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 Indicated by Table A.2.4, ACs oscillate and become less signicant when
agents extrapolate weakly (say, for  d = 0:5), but become more signicant
when agents extrapolate strongly (say,  d = 1:1).
 Comparing with the previous cases, there is less herd behavior. This is
partially because of the less signicant protability of one strategy with
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FIGURE 4.2. Time series plots for wealth and population distribu-
tions, returns and prices when the same momentum trading strategies
with different lags (L1;L2) = (10;14) are used. Here,   = 0:6;  d = 1:2
and q = 0:03.
 (L1;L2) = (10;26):
 The upper bound d for returns of the underlying deterministic system to
be stable increases to d 2 (2:2;2:3).
 By adding the noisy process, with the same parameters and initial values,
protability of type 1 trading strategy (with lag length 10) becomes ques-
tionable, as indicated by the time series plots in Figures A.2.3 and 4.3 and
the corresponding statistics in Table A.2.3.
 As demonstrated by Table A.2.4, the ACs have less patterns and do not
die out as lags increase.
4.2.1. Summary. In summarizing, we obtain the following results when both types of
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FIGURE 4.3. Time series plots for wealth and population distribu-
tions, returns and prices when the same momentum trading strategies
with different lags (L1;L2) = (10;26) are used. Here,   = 0:6;  d =
1:2;q = 0:03 and  wo = 0:6.
 Without the noisy process, an increase in lag length from either one of the
trading strategies stabilizes the return series of the underlying deterministic
system, and enlarges the range of the extrapolation. However, for the same
set of parameters, the protability of the trading strategies and herd behavior
become less signicant.
 Adding the noisy dividend process in general improves the protability of the
trading strategies with short lag length L1 (say, (L1;L2) = (3;5) and (3;7)).
However, such protability becomes less signicant when the short lag length
L1 increase, and is even questionable (say (L1;L2) = (10;14) and (10;26)).
 When trading strategies become protable, agents tend to adopt a herd behav-
ior  more agents switch to the more protable strategy over the time period.
However, over concentration (in terms of the initial average wealth, population
proportion), or over extrapolation (in terms of high extrapolation rates and im-
proper risk premium levels) can cause overshooting of price and push prices to
explosion, leading to a market crash.
 Momentum trading strategies can push the prices to a very high level and lead
the returns to be more volatile, exhibiting volatility clustering.
 ACs follow certain patterns when one of the trading strategies becomes prof-
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when the protability of the trading strategy becomes less signicant, and even
questionable.
 Price levels are more determined by the risk premium levels rather than other
parameters (say extrapolation rate and switching intensity).
5. WEALTH DYNAMICS OF CONTRARIAN TRADING STRATEGIES
In this section, we consider the quasi-homogeneous model with d1 = d2 = d < 0
and 1  L1 < L2, that is both types of agents follow the same contrarian trading strat-
egy except for having different memory lengths. As discussed in Section 3, some em-
pirical studies suggest that contrarian trading strategies are more protable over long
periods. Our results in this section provide some support for this view and show that
the adaptive model presented in this paper is capable of characterizing some features
founded in empirical studies. Furthermore, similar to the previous section, wealth and
population distributions, statistical properties of returns (such as volatility clustering,
autocorrelations), and herd behavior are discussed.
5.1. Case: (L1;L2) = (3;5). With the selection of the parameters and initial values
in (3.8)-(3.9), consider rst in the next subsection the dynamics of the underlying
deterministic system, that is, when q = 0. The impact of the noisy processes on the
dynamics is then studied in the subsequent subsection.
5.1.1. No-noise Case. Let q = 0. For  d =  0:4, initial difference of population
proportions no = 0 and any initial wealth proportion  wo, it is found that
t ! 
 = 15:45% (annual);  wt !  wo; nt ! 0:
By changing parameters and initial values, the following results are obtained.
 Risk premium and over-pricing
It is found that, ceteris paribus, for   = =2 = 0:4, t !  = 11:52%, while
for   = 0:6,  = 15:45%. In general, a high level of risk-adjusted premium
leads to a high return and a high price correspondingly. In fact, for the given
parameters, there exists o 2 (0:6;0:7), a so called bifurcation value, such that
the returns converge to xed values for   < o and diverge for   > o, leading
prices to explode.
 Over-reaction and price shooting
Based on the parameters selected, there exists do 2 ( 0:53; 0:52) such that,
ceteris paribus, returns converge to xed values for (0 >)  d > do and diverge
for  d < do, leading prices to overshoot. Like the momentum trading strategies,
over-extrapolation from contrarian trading strategies also cause overshooting
of prices.
 Wealth distribution
Unlike the case of the momentum trading strategies, wealth distributions of
the deterministic system are affected differently by the extrapolation rate  d,
switching intensity, initial wealth and population distributions.
 In general, as  d(< 0 decreases and is near the bifurcation value, the prof-
itability of trading strategy with long lag (L = 5) is improved signi-
cantly, say from 5% for  d =  0:454, to 25% for  d =  0:48, and to 50%
for  d =  0:5. However, for xed  d < 0, say  d =  0:5, as  increases,
the protability of trading strategy 2 becomes less signicantly, say from22 CARL CHIARELLA AND XUE-ZHONG HE
45% for  = 0:1 to 20% for  = 2. This is different from the case of
using momentum trading strategy.
 For xed no 6= 0 and a range of  wo (say, no = 0:3 and  wo 2 ( 0:5;0:5)),
t ! 
 = 15:45% (annual);  wt !  wo   ; nt ! 0
with   10 6. This implies that agents' wealth are distributed according
to their initial wealth distribution, although populations are not evenly
distributed initially.
 For xed  wo < 0 (say,  wo =  0:3) and no 2 [ 1;1], type 2 agents
accumulated more wealth than type 1 agents over a very short period,
but the difference is not signicant (about 1%). In other words, when
the initial average wealth for type 2 agents is more than average wealth
for type 1 agents, no one of the contrarian trading strategies can make
signicant prot over the other, no matter how the initial populations are
distributed.
 For xed  wo > 0 (say,  wo = 0:3) and no 2 [ 1;1], type 2 agents ac-
cumulated more wealth than type 1 agents over a very short period, and
the difference becomes more signicant (up to 37%) as more agents use
type 2 trading strategy initially. This implies that, when the initial average
wealth of type 1 agents is higher than the one of type 2 agents, agents
using contrarian strategy with long memory length (L2 = 5) are able to
accumulate more wealth over a very short period than agents using the
same strategy but with short memory length (L1 = 3). In addition, the
protability becomes more signicant when there are more agents using
the strategy with long memory length initially. This is different from the
case when agents use momentum strategies.
 Herd behavior
The dynamics have no signicant difference for different switching intensity
parameter  when the returns of the underlying deterministic system is stable.
However, as  d near the bifurcation value, herd behavior is also observed.
5.1.2. Effect of Noise. Let the annualized standard derivation of the noisy dividend
yield process q = 3%. The following results are based on the parameters selected
above, unless the difference is indicated.
 Wealth distribution
 Effect of the initial wealth distribution  When the wealth and population
are evenly distributed among two types of trading strategies initially (i.e.
 wo = 0;no = 0), type 2 agents accumulate more average wealth (about
5% to 7%) more than type 2 agents over the whole period, as indicated
in Figure 5.1 for the time series plots on wealth and population. Also, as
extrapolations increase (i.e. as  d decreases), such extrapolations help type
2 agents accumulate more wealth than type 1 agents (say, about 5% for
 d =  0:45, and about 45% for  d =  0:5). This suggests that, when both
types of agents start with the same level of wealth and have equal number
of traders, agents using long memory length (L2 = 5) accumulate more
wealth than ones using short memory length (L1 = 3). In other words,
type 2 agents benet signicantly from the noisy dividend noisy process.ADAPTIVE MODEL AND WEALTH DYNAMICS OF MOMENTUM STRATEGIES 23
This result still holds when the initial wealth are not so evenly distributed
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FIGURE 5.1. Time series plots for wealth and population distribu-
tions, returns and prices when the same contrarian trading strategies
with different lags (L1;L2) = (3;5) are used. Here,   = 0:6;  d =
 0:45 and q = 0:03.
 Effect of the initial population distribution Similar to the case without
noise, the wealth distribution is affected differently as a function of dif-
ferent initial wealth levels. For xed  wo < 0 and a range of no (say,
 wo =  0:3 and no 2 ( 0:8;0:65)), the protability of trading strategy 2
does not change much for different no. However, for xed  wo > 0 and a
range of no (say,  wo = 0:3 and no 2 ( 0:9;0:9)), the protability of trad-
ing strategy 2 increases signicantly as more and more agents use trading
strategy 2. Price overshooting is possible when the populations are over
concentrated in use of one of the trading strategies.
 Herd behavior
Herd behavior is also observed for changing parameter . Given the protabil-
ity of the trading strategy over the long memory span, more agents tend to
switch to this more protable strategy, as indicated by the time series plot of
population in Figure 5.1 and the corresponding statistic in Table A.2.5. Fur-
thermore, as  increases, both prices and returns become more volatile, leading
to excess volatility.24 CARL CHIARELLA AND XUE-ZHONG HE
 Excess volatility and volatility clustering
The addition of a noisy process cause an otherwise stable return series to be
exhibit uctuations. Similar to the case of using momentum trading strategies,
an increase of either the standard derivation of the dividend yield noisy process
q, or agents extrapolation  d, leads both returns and prices to be more volatile.
Moreover, volatility clustering is also observed, as illustrated by the time series
plot on the return in Figure 5.1 and the corresponding statistics in Table A.2.5.
 Autocorrelation
ACs are signicantly negative for odd lags and positive for even lags for all
lags, as indicated in Table A.2.6.
 Overshooting  Similar to the momentum trading strategies discussed in Sec-
tion 4, the noisy process has a signicant impact on prices. An increase of q
can push prices to signicantly high levels. This can also result from either
strong extrapolation (corresponding to low  d), or high risk premia  , or high
switching density  and causes prices to explode.
5.2. Other Cases.
 (L1;L2) = (3;7): The general dynamic features are similar to the case when
(L1;L2) = (3;5), except for the differences indicated below.
 The underlying deterministic system is stable over a wide range of extrap-
olation rates  d 2 (d;0] with d 2 ( 0:53; 0:52) for L2 = 5, while with
d 2 ( 0:65; 0:6) for L2 = 7.
 Similar to the previous case, the trading strategy with long lag L2 = 7
dominates the market,in particular, when  d is near the bifurcation value.
However, for the same set of parameters, compared with the case of L2 =
5, the protability is reduced slightly. On the other hand, agents can ex-
trapolate over a wide range (of the parameter  d). Similar impacts of initial
wealth and population distributions, the switching intensity, and the stan-
dard derivation of the noisy process on the dynamics can be observed over
a wider range of the parameters.
 (L1;L2) = (10;14):
 The lower bound d for returns of the underlying deterministic system to
be stable decreases to d 2 ( 1:6; 1:5). By adding the noisy process,
with the same parameters and initial values, the protability of type 1
trading strategy (with lag length 14) becomes questionable, as indicated
by the time series plots of the wealth in Figure 5.2 and the corresponding
statistics in Table A.2.5.
 The patterns of the ACs are maintained, but they become less signicant
(for the same parameter  d =  0:45), as shown in Table A.2.6.
 Compared with the previous cases, there is less herd behavior, as illus-
trated by the time series plot for the population in Figure 5.2 and the cor-
responding statics in Table A.2.5. This is partially because of the less
signicant (even no) protability of the strategy with lag 14 over the other
with lag 10.
 (L1;L2) = (10;26): The following differences have been observed.
 In this case the lower bound d (on  d) such that returns of the underlying
deterministic system be stable decreases to d 2 ( 2:2; 2:1). By adding
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FIGURE 5.2. Time series plots for wealth and population distribu-
tions, returns and prices when the same contrarian trading strategies
with different lags (L1;L2) = (10;14) are used. Here,   = 0:6;  d =
 0:45 and q = 0:03.
more wealth than the one with lag length 10, as shown in Figure 5.3 and
Table A.2.5. However, comparing with the previous cases (L1;L2) =
(3;5);(3;7), the protability of the strategy of lag 26 over the one with
lag 10 is much less signicant (at about 0.01% to 0.04% more for  d =
 0:45), although a strong extrapolation can improve the protability of
the strategy with lag 26 (at about 5% to 7% for  d =  2:0).
 The ACs become less signicant when agents extrapolate weakly (say,
 d =  0:45), as indicated in Table A.2.6 , and more signicant when agent
extrapolate strongly (say,  d =  2:0).
5.2.1. Summary. In summarizing, we obtain the following results when both
types of agents follow the same contrarian trading strategy, but with different
memory lengths.
 Without the noisy process and a given set of parameters, an increase in lag
lengths of the trading strategies stabilizes the return series of the underly-
ing deterministic system. As both  d and  are near their bifurcation val-
ues, the protability of trading strategies and herd behavior are observed,
in general.
 Adding a noisy dividend process, in general, improves the protability of
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FIGURE 5.3. Time series plots for wealth and population distribu-
tions, returns and prices when the same contrarian trading strategies
with different lags (L1;L2) = (10;26) are used. Here,   = 0:5;  d =
 0:4 and q = 0:01.
such protability becomes less signicant when the relative difference be-
tween the two lag lengths is small (say, L1 = 10;L2 = 14).
 Similar to the case of using momentum trading strategies, herd behavior is
observed when one of the trading strategies becomes (signicantly) prof-
itable. Also, over-concentration (in terms of the initial average wealth and
population proportion), or over extrapolation (in terms of low extrapola-
tion rates and improper risk premium levels) can cause overshooting of
price and push prices to explode, leading to a market crash. Price lev-
els are more determined by the risk premium levels than other parameters
(say extrapolation rate and switching intensity).
 The ACs are signicantly negative for odd lags and positive for even lags
when the memory lengths of the contrarian trading strategies are small.
However, they become less signicant when the memory lengths increase.
6. CONCLUSIONS
To incorporate investor psychology into the standard asset pricing theory in nance
and characterize the interaction of heterogeneous agents, an adaptive model on asset
pricing and wealth dynamics with agents using various trading strategies is developed.ADAPTIVE MODEL AND WEALTH DYNAMICS OF MOMENTUM STRATEGIES 27
As a special case, a quasi-homogeneous model of two types of agents using either mo-
mentum or contrarian trading strategies is introduced to analyze the protability of the
trading strategies over different time intervals. It is found that agents with different
time-horizon coexist. Our results shed light on the empirical nding that momentum
trading strategies are more protable over short time intervals, while contrarian trading
strategies are more protable over long time intervals. It should be pointed out that this
is an unexpected result from the set up of the adaptive model. Even though the quasi-
homogeneous model is one of the simplest cases of the adaptive model, it generates
various phenomena observed in nancial markets, including rational adaptiveness of
agents, overcondence and underreaction, overreaction and pricing shooting, herd be-
havior, excess volatility, and volatility clustering. The model also displays the essential
characteristics of the standard asset price dynamics model assumed in continuous time
nance in that the asset price is uctuating around a geometrically growing trend.
Our analysis in this paper is based on a simplied quasi-homogeneous model and
further analysis on the adaptive model is necessary to explore the potential explanatory
power of the model. One of the extensions is to consider models of two or three
different types of trading strategies, to analyze the protability of different trading
strategies, and to examine the stylized facts of the return distribution. Secondly, the
attitudes of investors towards the extrapolation and risk premium change when the
market environment changes and this change should be made endogenous. Thirdly,
there should be a more extensive simulation study of these richer models once they
are developed. In fact a proper Monte-Carlo analysis is required to determine whether
the models can generate with a high frequency the statistical characteristics of major
indices such as the S&P500. These extensions are interesting problems which are left
to future research work.28 CARL CHIARELLA AND XUE-ZHONG HE
Appendix A.1. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.1





 Wi;t 1[R + (t   r) i;t 1]
 Wt
=
 wi;t 1[R + (t   r) i;t 1]












 wj;t 1[R + (t   r) j;t 1]: (A.1.2)
Then both (A.1.1) and (A.1.2) lead to (2.8).
With the notations introduced in Section 2, the market clearing equilibrium price equation
(2.5) can be rewritten as:
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Substituting (A.1.7) into (A.1.6),
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: (A.1.10)ADAPTIVE MODEL AND WEALTH DYNAMICS OF MOMENTUM STRATEGIES 29
Substitution of (A.1.9) and (A.1.10) into (A.1.8) and simplication of the corresponding ex-
pression leads to equation
h X
j=1
nj;t  wj;t 1 j;t[R + (t   r) j;t 1]
= [(t   r) + (1 + r   t)]
 h X
j=1
nj;t 1 j;t 1  wj;t 1

: (A.1.11)
Solving for t from (A.1.11), one obtains equation (2.9) for the return t. 30 CARL CHIARELLA AND XUE-ZHONG HE
Appendix A.2. TIME SERIES PLOTS, STATISTIC AND AUTOCORRELATION RESULTS
For both momentum and contrarian trading strategies with different combinations of lag
lengths (L1;L2), this appendix provide
 Time series plots for wealth (  wt, the difference of wealth proportions), population (nt,
the difference of population proportions), returns (t), and prices (pt);
 Numericalcomparativestaticsforwealth(WEA),population(POP),andreturns(RET);
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FIGURE A.2.1. Time series plots for wealth and population distribu-
tions, returns and prices when the same momentum trading strategies
with different lags (L1;L2) = (3;7) are used. Here,   = 0:6;  d = 0:53
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FIGURE A.2.2. Time series plots for wealth and population distribu-
tions, returns and prices when the same momentum trading strategies
with different lags (L1;L2) = (10;14) are used. Here,   = 0:6;  d =
0:53 and q = 0:03.
(3, 5) (3, 7)
RET WEA POP RET WEA POP
Mean 0.000721 0.023248 0.003062 0.000525 0.003973 0.000484
Median 0.000691 0.022135 0.001505 0.000542 0.004138 0.000219
Maximum 0.043964 0.050955 0.042773 0.023386 0.008098 0.012162
Minimum -0.046662 -1.00E-06 -0.002759 -0.021407 -4.00E-06 -0.00715
Std. Dev. 0.011343 0.014838 0.004475 0.006339 0.002526 0.001512
Skewness -0.020851 0.155153 2.998613 0.023471 0.032782 1.6045
Kurtosis 3.241269 1.815871 15.84896 2.9332 1.589621 10.42554
Jarque-Bera 12.49201 312.2396 41896.41 1.389 415.389 13635.28
Probability 0.001938 0 0 0.499324 0 0
TABLE A.2.1. Statistics of time series of wealth, population and re-
turns for momentum trading strategies with (L1;L2) = (3;5);(3;7)
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FIGURE A.2.3. Time series plots for wealth and population distribu-
tions, returns and prices when the same momentum trading strategies
with different lags (L1;L2) = (10;26) are used. Here,   = 0:6;  d =
0:53 and q = 0:03.
(10, 14)(a) (10, 14)(b)
RET WEA POP RET WEA POP
Mean 0.000641 0.000215 2.36E-05 0.000739 0.004879 0.000536
Median 0.000682 0.000233 6.00E-06 0.000685 0.005311 0.000173
Maximum 0.019241 0.000403 0.001285 0.02642 0.008898 0.015336
Minimum -0.014757 -3.00E-06 -0.001252 -0.021672 0 -0.004178
Std. Dev. 0.004793 0.000118 0.000232 0.006001 0.002481 0.001424
Skewness -0.016961 -1.52E-01 0.506932 0.069921 -0.211947 2.629638
Kurtosis 3.018244 1.900675 6.319931 3.119651 2.01417 15.73849
Jarque-Bera 0.309123 270.9888 2510.89 7.058159 239.9537 39576.5
Probability 0.856791 0 0 0.029332 0 0
TABLE A.2.2. Statistics of time series of wealth, population and re-
turns for momentum trading strategies with (L1;L2) = (10;14) and
  = 0:6;q = 0:03,  d = 0:53 for (a) and  d = 1:2 for (b).ADAPTIVE MODEL AND WEALTH DYNAMICS OF MOMENTUM STRATEGIES 33
(10, 26)(a) (10, 26)(b)
RET WEA POP RET WEA POP
Mean 0.000641 8.66E-06 -7.90E-07 0.000651 -0.000483 -6.68E-05
Median 0.000678 5.00E-06 -1.30E-05 0.000521 -0.000365 -8.70E-05
Maximum 0.01877 7.80E-05 0.002522 0.020166 0.000299 0.008564
Minimum -1.48E-02 -6.20E-05 -0.002285 -0.019343 -0.001257 -0.007335
Std. Dev. 0.00473 2.33E-05 0.000328 0.005295 0.000433 0.001248
Skewness -2.04E-02 0.217143 0.159003 0.090161 -0.091597 0.23871
Kurtosis 3.001559 3.132038 7.858779 2.949879 1.620711 7.002653
Jarque-Bera 0.346695 42.93333 4940.334 7.298971 403.4138 3385.919
Probability 0.840845 0 0 0.026004 0 0
TABLE A.2.3. Statistics of time series of wealth, population and
returns for momentum trading strategies with (L1;L2) = (10;26),
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FIGURE A.2.4. Time series plots for wealth and population distri-
butions, returns and prices when the same contrarian trading strategies
with different lags (L1;L2) = (3;7) are used. Here,   = 0:6;  d =
 0:45 and q = 0:03.34 CARL CHIARELLA AND XUE-ZHONG HE
Lag (3,5) (3,7) (10,14) (10, 14)(a) (10, 26) (10, 26)(a)
1 0.775 0.567 0.21 0.519 0.17 0.369
2 0.412 0.265 0.063 0.293 0.048 0.157
3 -0.04 0.009 0.025 0.178 0.019 0.076
4 -0.492 -0.317 -0.015 0.146 -0.023 0.041
5 -0.753 -0.366 -0.018 0.105 -0.021 0.025
6 -0.824 -0.314 0.006 0.06 0.006 -0.016
7 -0.643 -0.257 0.01 0.005 0.01 -0.03
8 -0.287 -0.182 -0.009 -0.036 -0.009 -0.048
9 0.118 -0.057 0.002 -0.1 0.005 -0.075
10 0.489 0.037 -0.017 -0.191 -0.013 -0.113
11 0.696 0.108 -0.095 -0.35 -0.094 -0.284
12 0.704 0.189 -0.044 -0.308 -0.033 -0.202
13 0.514 0.185 -0.016 -0.258 -0.005 -0.094
14 0.187 0.135 -0.026 -0.239 -0.005 -0.037
15 -0.176 0.084 -0.114 -0.304 -0.029 -0.009
16 -0.478 -0.007 -0.041 -0.245 -0.002 0.017
17 -0.628 -0.065 -0.016 -0.167 0 0.034
18 -0.602 -0.077 -0.007 -0.106 -0.002 0.03
19 -0.411 -0.084 0.019 -0.05 0.017 0.028
20 -0.114 -0.084 0.015 -0.028 0.013 0.035
21 0.2 -0.057 -0.009 0.023 -0.012 0.045
22 0.448 -0.033 -0.007 0.09 -0.006 0.066
23 0.56 -0.022 -0.002 0.107 -0.002 0.063
24 0.509 0.018 -0.014 0.12 -0.017 0.053
25 0.322 0.038 0.013 0.15 0.009 0.014
26 0.05 0.04 0.031 0.191 0.006 -0.019
27 -0.227 0.065 0.018 0.192 -0.036 -0.106
28 -0.424 0.048 0.017 0.172 -0.001 -0.091
29 -0.499 0.018 -0.002 0.147 -0.011 -0.055
30 -0.428 0 0.014 0.115 0.001 -0.03
31 -0.241 -0.029 0.003 0.099 -0.004 -0.008
32 0.006 -0.044 0.036 0.054 0.034 0.008
33 0.241 -0.038 0.014 0.027 0.015 0.007
34 0.399 -0.033 -0.032 -0.003 -0.03 0.008
35 0.436 -0.03 -0.014 -0.016 -0.011 -0.015
36 0.348 0.001 -0.023 -0.041 -0.023 0.011
TABLE A.2.4. Autocorrelation coefcients (AC) of returns for mo-
mentum trading strategies with (L1;L2) = (3;5);(3;7);(10;14) and
(10;26). The parameters are:   = 0:6;  d = 0:53 and q = 0:03 for
(3;5);(3;7);(10;14) and (10;26);   = 0:6;  d = 1:2 and q = 0:03 for
(10;14)(a); and   = 0:6;  d = 1:2 and q = 0:03 and (10;26)(a).ADAPTIVE MODEL AND WEALTH DYNAMICS OF MOMENTUM STRATEGIES 35
(3, 5) (3, 7)
RET WEA POP RET WEA POP
Mean 0.000732 -0.021357 -0.002489 0.000586 -0.003781 -0.000436
Median 0.000565 -0.020961 -0.00115 0.00061 -0.003947 -0.000253
Maximum 0.058371 1.00E-06 0.001417 0.024943 1.00E-06 0.001301
Minimum -0.049512 -0.041469 -0.02122 -0.024361 -0.007294 -0.005522
Std. Dev. 0.0172 0.012664 0.003256 0.007258 0.002071 0.000648
Skewness 3.94E-02 -0.23075 -1.79741 -2.38E-02 0.128596 -1.706059
Kurtosis 2.623585 1.776767 6.184726 2.73569 1.77624 7.727226
Jarque-Bera 30.8166 356.1715 4806.214 15.02887 325.8435 7082.505
Probability 0 0 0 0.000545 0 0
(10, 14) (10, 26)
RET WEA POP RET WEA POP
Mean 0.000546 -1.36E-05 -1.74E-06 0.000587 -9.89E-05 -1.53E-05
Median 0.000481 -5.00E-06 -5.00E-06 0.000674 -1.00E-04 -4.00E-06
Maximum 0.018059 2.10E-05 0.000912 0.016719 1.60E-05 0.001042
Minimum -0.018072 -5.40E-05 -0.000972 -0.018608 -2.74E-04 -0.001083
Std. Dev. 0.004875 2.01E-05 0.000136 0.004787 8.84E-05 0.000182
Skewness 0.067356 -0.269859 0.137827 -0.084361 -0.498882 -0.30024
Kurtosis 3.073003 1.604405 7.232651 2.928112 2.074143 6.742584
Jarque-Bera 4.891911 466.5478 3748.941 7.008679 386.0658 2993.831
Probability 0.086643 0 0 0.030067 0 0
TABLE A.2.5. Statistics of time series of wealth, population and re-
turns for contrarian trading strategies with parameters   = 0:6;  d =
 0:45 and q = 0:03 and lag length combinations (L1;L2) are (3, 5) for
(a), (3, 7) for (b), (10, 14) for (c), and (10, 26) for (d).36 CARL CHIARELLA AND XUE-ZHONG HE
Lag (3,5) (3,7) (10,14) (10, 26)
1 -0.944 -0.678 -0.144 -0.155
2 0.922 0.53 0.056 0.047
3 -0.914 -0.529 -0.014 -0.025
4 0.93 0.636 -0.01 0.003
5 -0.924 -0.563 -0.001 0.001
6 0.926 0.479 0 -0.003
7 -0.914 -0.462 0.016 0.01
8 0.909 0.533 -0.003 0.004
9 -0.902 -0.51 0.009 0.001
10 0.906 0.452 0.011 -0.003
11 -0.9 -0.428 0.097 0.107
12 0.896 0.451 -0.016 -0.039
13 -0.891 -0.427 0.026 0.009
14 0.889 0.393 -0.013 0.006
15 -0.884 -0.371 0.051 -0.027
16 0.882 0.37 -0.017 0.009
17 -0.876 -0.366 0.014 -0.004
18 0.875 0.351 -0.013 0.013
19 -0.869 -0.337 0.009 -0.001
20 0.867 0.34 -0.008 -0.01
21 -0.863 -0.322 0.01 0.004
22 0.861 0.297 0.025 -0.001
23 -0.858 -0.282 -0.008 -0.016
24 0.857 0.277 0.016 -0.014
25 -0.851 -0.271 -0.02 0
26 0.849 0.245 0.012 -0.002
27 -0.844 -0.232 -0.002 0.043
28 0.844 0.228 0.014 -0.014
29 -0.841 -0.224 -0.001 0.021
30 0.838 0.215 -0.002 -0.019
31 -0.833 -0.202 -0.019 0.013
32 0.83 0.193 -0.01 -0.009
33 -0.828 -0.186 -0.012 0.007
34 0.825 0.181 0.021 0.001
35 -0.82 -0.162 0.01 0.008
36 0.817 0.162 0.001 0.01
TABLE A.2.6. Autocorrelation coefcients (AC) of returns for con-
trarian trading strategies with parameters   = 0:6;  d =  0:45; =
0:5 and q = 0:03 and lag length combinations (L1;L2) =
(3;5);(3;7);(10;14) and (10;26).ADAPTIVE MODEL AND WEALTH DYNAMICS OF MOMENTUM STRATEGIES 37
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